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Are metaphorical words and phrases merely clever use (or abuse) of language, or do they
tell us something important about human thought and communication? Conceptual Metaphor
Theory (CMT), initially proposed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in 1980, claims that
commonplace metaphorical expressions like “rising prices” and “a warm relationship” reflect
deep conceptual relationships (e.g. MORE IS UP and AFFECTION IS TEMPERATURE) that
shape almost all of human cognition. CMT is supported by the “embodiment hypothesis,” the
proposal that ordinary language use and comprehension involves areas of the brain primarily
concerned with perception and muscle control (e.g. Barsalou, 1998). These ideas challenge core
assumptions of traditional theories about both language and mind, and they have drawn intense
criticism.
Based on evidence from his own and others’ research, Raymond Gibbs, Jr. has been a
major contributor to developing the embodiment hypothesis and a leading defender of CMT.
The “metaphor wars” in the title (ARGUMENT IS WAR) expresses both the often heated nature
of the theoretical disputes and Gibbs’s frustration with the failure of many critics to address the
extensive empirical evidence in support of the embodiment hypothesis and CMT. The WAR
metaphor implies symbolic violence and “zero-sum” outcomes of victory or defeat. Yet,
throughout the book, Gibbs emphasizes the value of ideas from both sides of the debate and
insists that no one theory will explain everything. The tone and apparent intention of the book
seem better captured by an alternative metaphor such as ARGUMENT IS BUSINESS AND
NEGOTIATION (Gerard Steen, quoted in Rasulić, 2017), or perhaps ARGUMENT IS
CONSTRUCTION or ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY.
Background: Setting the stage

This book seems to mark a kind of “milepost” or perhaps even a “turning point” in the
development of Gibbs’s own theoretical views (ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY). He draws on
his own extensive experimental research as well as his encyclopedic knowledge of others’
research, first to explain the major criticisms of CMT, then to refute many of these criticisms,
and finally to qualify and moderate claims of CMT that have not been fully supported by
empirical research, thereby building a foundation for a synthesis that would combine the stronger
elements of several theories, including CMT.
Gibbs opens with a brief summary of the difference between the Cognitive Linguistics
and traditional approaches that treat language, including metaphor, as distinct from both mind
and experience. This is followed by a summary of the most important criticisms of CMT from a
variety of perspectives including traditional linguistics theories. These sections provide the
background for a detailed summary, analysis, and critique of the major criticisms of CMT and
the embodiment hypotheses, which makes up the largest part of the book. Gibbs gives a brief,
clear explanation of CMT and the embodiment hypothesis, but generally assumes a relatively
sophisticated knowledge of both language theory and of current metaphor theories. The book
will primarily appeal to scholars, researchers, and advanced students who are already well-versed
in CMT, competing theories of language and metaphor, and the on-going disputes between
advocates for these alternative approaches.
The heart of the book: Review, critique, and synthesis.
Gibbs represents the theoretical issues at stake in this argument and the evidence
supporting each position clearly and succinctly, and lays the foundation for future synthesis. The
book is impressive for Gibbs’s encyclopedic mastery of an enormous volume of research, and for
his balanced and thoughtful treatment of research that contradicts his own views. He refutes

some claims of other researchers but more frequently shows how the claims of research from
different perspectives might be integrated into a broader, more complex account of metaphor use
and comprehension. The overall tone of the book is transitional, marked by debates not only
with other researchers and scholars, but also within Gibbs’s own conceptualization of the topic.
That is a decided strength of the book: It’s like looking over the shoulder of one of the top
researchers in cognitive linguistics as he wrestles with a mass of contradiction-ridden research
findings and balances the apparent contradictions – never understating the complexity of the
issues.
Although his review of contradictory research is generally thorough and balanced, there
are a few places in which Gibbs overlooks potentially important research. In the introductory
chapter, Gibbs contextualizes the discussion within a rejection of the traditional computational
model of mind and language, specifically citing and disagreeing with Pinker. Here he might
usefully have cited Barsalou (1998 and subsequent), who demonstrates that all higher-order
cognitive processes can in principle be accomplished through fully embodied “perceptual
simulations.”
In his review of alternative approaches to metaphor comprehension Gibbs briefly
mentions Kintsch’s demonstration that an approach based on natural language statistics (cooccurrence of words and phrases) can account for at least simple idiomatic metaphors. Here it
might have been useful to acknowledge the evidence from some of Kintsch’s colleagues (e.g.
Landauer & Dumais, 1997) that much of our vocabulary (presumably including idiomatic
metaphors Gibbs discusses, like “kick the bucket” and “spill the beans”) is learned initially
through connections with other language as it is encountered in spoken and written contexts, and

not through direct correlation with embodied experience. Landauer and Dumais’s work might
also contribute to an eventual “grand synthesis” theory of metaphor.
In his otherwise astute discussion of framing research, including Thibodeau and
Boroditsky’s “crime is a beast / virus” experiments, Gibbs fails to address the recent research by
Steen, Reijnierse, and Burgers (2013), who replicated Thibodeau and Boroditsky and found no
evidence of framing effects, implying that metaphorical framing may be weaker than previously
claimed. In his discussion of neurological research using fMRI, Gibbs also fails to address the
trenchant criticisms by Casasanto and Gijssels (2015), who demonstrate flaws in the fMRI
research that has generally supported CMT and contrast it with fMRI other research that has
found no evidence of embodiment effects.
In his discussion of Steen’s Deliberate Metaphor Theory, Gibbs rightly criticizes Steen’s
failure to consider experimental evidence showing that people respond at least weakly to the
metaphors implied by idioms like “chew on an idea” or “warm relationship.” However, he rather
too easily dismisses Steen’s claim that metaphors are sometimes used deliberately (i.e. as a result
of conscious deliberation and selection). Indeed, Gibbs’s argument against deliberate metaphor
use is implicitly contradicted by some of his own claims. For example, on p. 173, he observes
that “asking people to explain their thoughts when using verbal metaphors provides one kind of
empirical evidence on the existence of conceptual metaphors…” If people are able to respond in
this way they must also be able to deliberate about and report their deliberations about metaphor
use, consistent with Steen. The point that Steen ignores experimental evidence of embodied
response to commonplace metaphor vehicles is well-taken, and Steen might further be criticized
for conflating characteristics of the message, which can be observed and measured, with thought
processes of the message originator and perceivers’ attributions about the originator, neither of

which can be directly observed. However, the fact that neither researcher nor research
participant can have direct knowledge of an originator’s thought processes doesn’t support the
stronger claim that metaphors are never or even rarely used deliberately, or that attributions of
intentionality might influence a perceiver’s processing effort. As noted above, these are minor
issues in a generally thorough and insightful review of metaphor research.
Summary: The state of play
CMT was proposed as an elegantly simple theory based on the idea that human thought is
fundamentally metaphorical, that concepts are based on metaphorical mappings in which abstract
concepts like LOVE and LIFE are experienced as embodied concepts like WARMTH and MOTION
THROUGH SPACE.

As initially proposed, these conceptual metaphors are fixed and more or less

universal. Subsequent research has muddied this initial clarity in several ways. Most
importantly, research has consistently shown that the “source domains” of conceptual metaphors
are at least weakly activated whenever metaphorical language is processed, supporting one of the
fundamental claims of CMT. On the other hand, based on the accumulating evidence: (1)
research has failed to substantiate in any conclusive way that these weak activations have a
consistent effect on outcomes such as beliefs and opinions, (2) people do not necessarily
interpret metaphors the same way and do not associate the same CMs with metaphors, and (3)
many other aspects of a communicative situation independently affect metaphor use and
interpretation. CMT emerges from Gibbs’s review as an elegant and powerful theory about the
interconnectedness of mind, language, and embodied experience that has been only partially
supported by subsequent, often contradictory, research. As Gibbs highlights throughout the
book, many aspects of the theory remain undecided pending further research. However,

supporters as well as critics of CMT will need to give thoughtful consideration to Gibbs’s
analysis and critique of evidence on both sides of the issue.
Overall assessment
This book, by one of the top researchers in cognitive linguistics, is an important
contribution to the debate about how people use and understand metaphor. Its flaws are few and
minor; its strengths many. The book provides a comprehensive review and critique of the
current state of research and theory about metaphor, and a solid foundation for developing a
“grand synthesis” theory of metaphor use and comprehension. Scholars and researchers with
even a secondary interest in metaphor theory, language theory, or general theories of cognition
will find this book important and engaging. Scholars and researchers engaged directly in
metaphor research will find it essential reading.
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